

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Dayshawn Allen,) C/A No. 4:14-4579-RBH-KDW
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
)
Jay Jordan,)
)
Defendant.)

)

This is a civil action filed pro se by a local detainee. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court. *See* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Dayshawn Allen (“Plaintiff”) is a pre-trial detainee housed at either Florence County Detention Center or Williamsburg County Detention Center for the last seven months. Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that neither he nor members of his family has been able to make contact with Defendant Jay Jordan, his court-appointed counsel, to discuss Plaintiff’s case or to try to get Plaintiff a bond hearing. *Id.* at 3-4. Plaintiff seeks to have Defendant relieved from representation and asks for compensatory damages for the attorney’s alleged failure to adequately represent Plaintiff. *Id.* at 5.

II. Standard of Review

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the

procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr.*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. *De'Lonta v. Angelone*, 330 F.3d 630, 630 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

III. Discussion

Initially, this court cannot exercise its federal question jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's allegations against his court-appointed criminal defense counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹

¹ Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. *Jennings v. Davis*, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973). The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their *federally guaranteed* rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. *McKnight v. Rees*, 88 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).

To state a plausible claim for damages under § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he or she was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *Monroe v. Page*, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); *see generally* 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1230 (2002). An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Deas v. Potts*, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1976) (private attorney); *Hall v. Quillen*, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980) (court-appointed attorney); *Polk Cnty. v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 317-24 (1981) (public defender); *see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (“Careful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement . . . also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.”). Defendant Jordan, a court-appointed defense attorney, does not act under color of state law in connection with his legal representation of Plaintiff, and, as a result, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a viable § 1983 claim against Defendant. No other potential basis for the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction in this case is evident from the face of the pleadings.

Liberally construing his pro se pleading, Plaintiff is claiming in his Complaint that his criminal defense attorney is liable to him for legal malpractice (also known as legal negligence). In the absence of diversity of citizenship between the parties, such a traditionally state-law based claim may not be considered by this court. *See Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat & Martin*, 804 F. Supp. 784, 788-91 (D.S.C. 1992); *see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duties of

care arising under state law). *Cf. Mitchell v. Holler*, 311 S.C. 406, 429 S.E.2d 793 (1993) (legal malpractice case heard in state court); *Yarborough v. Rogers*, 411 S.E.2d 424 (S.C. 1991) (same). It is clear from the face of the pleadings that there is no basis on which Plaintiff could assert that there is federal diversity jurisdiction over his Complaint because both Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of the state of South Carolina. *See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger*, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978) (diversity of citizenship requires that no party on one side of a case may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side). As result, there is no basis on which this court could exercise its diversity jurisdiction in this case.

Moreover, even if Defendant were considered to be a state actor, to the extent that Plaintiff requests injunctive relief from this court in the nature of an order terminating Defendant's representation, this case is barred by the doctrine established by *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its progeny. *Younger* and other cases hold that, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a state's pending criminal proceedings. *See, e.g., Younger*, 401 U.S. at 44; *Nivens v. Gilchrist*, 319 F.3d 151, 154-55 (4th Cir. 2003); *Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist*, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). In the *Cinema Blue* opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that federal district courts should abstain from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. 887 F.2d at 52. Also, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, expressly prohibits this court from enjoining such proceedings. *Bonner v. Circuit Ct. of St. Louis*, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975). In *Bonner*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit pointed out that federal constitutional claims are cognizable in both state courts and in federal

courts: “Congress and the federal courts have consistently recognized that federal courts should permit state courts to try state cases, and that, where constitutional issues arise, state court judges are fully competent to handle them subject to Supreme Court review.” *Id.*; *see also D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (federal courts cannot review state court proceedings in an appellate sense). Plaintiff is not foreclosed from raising his concerns about the adequacy of Defendant’s representation in his on-going state criminal prosecution before the presiding state-court judge and asking to have a new attorney appointed.¹ This court cannot remove the authority to rule on such issues from the judge who is actually in control on Plaintiff’s state criminal case, but removal of a court-appointed attorney in state court is not something this court can do under *Younger*, *Cinema Blue*, and *Bonner*.

IV. Recommendation

Accordingly, it is recommended that the district court dismiss the Complaint in this case *without prejudice*. *See Brown v. Briscoe*, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 (4th Cir. 1993); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

January 9, 2015
Florence, South Carolina

Kaymani D. West
United States Magistrate Judge

**The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
“Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”**

¹ This court offers no opinion regarding the potential success of such a claim brought in state

court.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

**Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503**

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).